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 Law enforcement is the utilization of various proven methods and practices 
developed over many years for maintaining order within society.  One of the primary 
functions of law enforcement is to establish methods for crime prevention.  Crime 
prevention involves identifying sources of crime and finding ways to eliminate or curb 
future crimes within the community.  The value of well developed and useful crime 
prevention methods benefits many parties, not just the community in general, but law 
enforcement organizations, taxpayers, and potential victims of crime. 
 Police departments can prevent criminal activity by implementing a special 
operations unit and lower crime rate within a city.  One of the more proven and effective 
crime prevention methods involves the establishment of a Special Operations Unit 
(SOU).  Special Operations Units involve law enforcement organizations working with 
the community within their jurisdictions through many initiatives, including increased 
police presence, community crime watch groups, and enhanced enforcement efforts. 
 More, Wegener, and Miller (2003) claimed, “Community policing has been 
extolled as the panacea for all of the problems faced by law enforcement.  It arrived with 
fanfare-supported by many national police organizations-and to a degree has taken the 
nation by storm” (p. 40).  However, in order to conduct a successful community policing 
effort, a department must have the direct participation and support of the community.  
The joint efforts of a SOU and community neighborhood crime watch group can provide 
lasting, long-term solutions to targeted areas where problems of crimes exceed the 
other areas of the jurisdiction. 
 Many law enforcement personnel and criminologists have contributed to the 
crime prevention debate and causes of criminal behavior.  Throughout the 20th century, 
some of these scholars and innovators have included August Vollmer, G.L. Keeling, 
O.W. Wilson, and G.J. Hawkins.  Their theories and opinions have been incorporated as 
support for this paper, as well as other authoritative references on policing.  
Professional journals, periodicals, personal interviews, and textbooks have all been 
used to support the basis for this discussion.    
 Prevention is the primary function of law enforcement, and reducing violent 
crimes can be achieved through the implementation of a special operations unit.  
Directed police patrols increase police presence in targeted areas and provide 
deterrence for crime.  The evidence for crime prevention through the creation of special 
operations units is supported by the numerous theories and sources that have 
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 One of the primary functions of law enforcement is to establish methods for crime 
prevention.  Crime prevention involves identifying sources of crime and finding ways to 
eliminate or curb future crimes within the community.  The value of well developed and 
useful crime prevention methods benefits many parties, not just the community in 
general, but law enforcement organizations, taxpayers, and potential victims of crime. 
 To complicate matters for law enforcement, problems associated with the 
distribution and use of illegal drugs, weapons, other dangerous contraband, and 
organized gang activity has raised awareness and urgency about crime prevention to a 
higher level of serious concern.  These are problems beyond ordinary patrol functions 
and require special considerations to manage.  Many cities have created special tasks 
forces and operational units to deal directly with concerns of increased gang related 
activity and illegal drug trafficking.  A special unit, designed, trained, and directed for a 
specific purpose, can provide a deterrent to crime and have a major impact on crime in 
targeted areas of any enforcement jurisdiction. 
The creation and activation of a special unit of officers within a law enforcement 
organization, or specific police department, can lower the crime rate within the 
department’s jurisdiction or city, thus allowing other resources to continue addressing 
specific emergency calls.  One of the more proven and effective crime prevention 
methods involves the establishment of a Special Operations Unit (SOU) (Lt. M. Geron, 
personal communication, December 9, 2009).  Special operations units require law 
enforcement organizations working with the community within their jurisdictions through 
many initiatives, including increased police presence, community crime watch groups, 
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and enhanced enforcement efforts.  This joint effort usually requires additional 
department resources and training for the officers and citizens involved, but the benefits 
can include long-term savings for the department as a whole.  
Reed (1995) stated, "Crimes occur because some particular individuals have 
both the desire and opportunity to commit crime” (p.1).  Therefore, crime prevention 
must address the two major aspects of why crimes are committed.  Law enforcement 
must eliminate the desire to commit a crime and eliminate opportunities for 
commencement of crimes.  An SOU addresses both of these major aspects of crime.  
An example of SOU success is the City of Dallas, Texas.  With a 57% reduction 
in gang related violence in specifically targeted areas of Dallas, the first 12 months 
reflected a major success with this initiative (Fritsch, Caeti, & Taylor, 2003). The Dallas 
Police Department created two separate special operations units and has experienced 
successful results with both.  One SOU unit was created in 1996 and was used for gang 
activity suppression.  The second unit, the Dallas Disruption Unit, was created in 2005 
and is used to saturate high crime neighborhood (Lt. M. Geron, personal 
communication, December 9, 2009). 
Police departments should utilize special operations units within the city.  The 
deterrence of crime is essentially the major goal of law enforcement.  According to 
George Payton (1971), “Preventive enforcement falls under the heading of protection, 
and involves the prevention of crime through the noticeable presence of police vehicles 
and personnel as a form of deterrence.  Prevention is the soundest of all criminological 
theories” (p.32).  Special operations units are tasked with the goal of crime prevention 
through reducing the opportunities for criminal activity.  
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POSITION 
Deterrence theory is still being debated today, but the first deterrence theory can 
be traced to utilitarian philosophers Cesare Beccaria (1748-94) and Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832), who believed “that people are motivated fundamentally to obtain pleasure 
and avoid pain” (Stafford & Goodrum, 2001, p. 3550).  According to deterrence theory, 
some criminals can be persuaded to cease their illicit activities if the pain is too great.  
The word pain refers not only to punishment for a crime, but the extent of trouble or 
work it takes to commit a criminal act, with the possibility of evading detection and 
apprehension.  The establishment of a Special Operations Unit (SOU) can be 
responsible for causing criminals more trouble than it may be worth to commit certain 
crimes in specific targeted areas.   
The general trend in sociology and criminology analysis of violent offenders 
supports the theory that most murders, assaulters, and, in some cases, rapists, are 
rarely arrested for the previously committed offense.  These violent offenders do not 
consider themselves career criminals and rarely do they make a career out of murder 
and assault (Clinard, Quinney, & Wildeman,1986). After analyzing this theory, it could 
be presumed that stopping a violent crime the first time it is attempted could possibly 
lead to preventing the crime from ever taking place, now or in the future.  Being in the 
right place at the right time can possibly save lives and keep potential violent offenders 
from having to be arrested to start with.  Directed patrols can make such an impact.    
When an SOU is established, there are three main tasks that must be assigned 
to the SOU.  The first tasks assigned to the SOU is to direct a specialized, trained group 
of officers into high crime areas, saturating the area for a specific number of days, 
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weeks or months.  This effort should increase the visibility of law enforcement to 
criminals and citizens alike.  The public and potential offenders use uniformed police 
officers and marked patrol cars to measure police presence in a given area (Reed, 
1995).  The second function of the SOU is to establish a neighborhood watch group 
within the targeted area.  This is an essential component of the SOU because without 
additional “eyes and ears” within the community, enhanced patrols may not be able to 
identify criminal elements unless they are caught in the act of a committing a crime.  
The third function of the SOU is to provide follow up enforcement of targeted areas.  
After the enhanced enforcement areas have been directed to new targeted areas, 
neighborhood watch groups must still be active and follow up of enhanced enforcement 
must be directed back to targeted areas on a periodic basis.  This follow up from the 
SOU may be weeks after the SOU has moved on to new targeted areas or months, 
depending on the success of the program. 
Special Operations Units require the cooperation and coordination of multiple 
divisions within a police department.  The SOU must coordinate not only within its own 
department, but the unit must also establish neighborhood crime watch groups in which 
there must be a coordination of information and enforcement efforts between the SOU 
and crime watch groups.  Above all, follow up and training is critical for both officers and 
citizens involved in the effort of the SOU.  One of the most important functions leading 
to success is the training of citizens in the neighborhood watch group.  With proper 
training on how to look for and recognize suspicious activity, citizens can be 
instrumental in reporting such activity and have the important details necessary to assist 
 5 
directed patrols.  Appendix A, Eyes of Rowlett, provides some of the important details 
that are useful to law enforcement when reporting suspicious activity.  
The SOU will generally become responsible for implementing a zero-tolerance 
policy towards all crime, regardless of the offense.  Typically, this will entail an increase 
in traffic citations and enforcement of petty offenses in the targeted area.  For example, 
increased citations in this goal are to make citizens and criminals aware that the SOU is 
there for citizen protection and crime prevention.  In the early 1990s, a directed police 
patrol deterrence experiment was conducted by the Kansas City Police Department in 
Kansas. This involvement in increased traffic enforcement led to a “65% increase in 
seizures of illegal firearms, and an associated 49% decrease in gun-related crime” in 
the targeted areas (McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001, p. 119).  Although 
these results are not guaranteed in each and every instance where directed police 
patrols are used, these statistics, with other supporting data, make a strong argument 
that directed police patrols are effective tools in preventing crime.         
 An SOU should be created in jurisdictions that can clearly identify a need for 
additional crime prevention.  Although one cannot place too high a price on the safety of 
its citizens, police departments must give serious consideration to the cost-benefit of 
establishing a SOU.  After proper analysis, a department may find it can make better 
use of resources for alternative crime prevention initiatives.  In this instance, it could be 
explained that violent crime and property crimes are not serious enough to warrant a 
direct response or special action on the part of the department. 
 As an effective tool in preventing crime, an SOU is generally successful at 
reducing violent crime and property crimes, which can be illustrated by the Dallas Police 
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Department in Texas.  The Dallas Disruption Unit, created in 2005, is patterned after a 
similar unit in Chicago, Illinois (Lt. M. Geron, personal communication, December 9, 
2009).  As of August 7, 2009, the City of Dallas has experienced a 23% drop in violent 
crime in the roughest parts of Dallas from August 2008 to July 2009 (Miles, 2009).  In 
most of the 26 targeted areas, the overall number of offenses committed or committed 
and detected, were significantly reduced, some as much as 63% from the year 2008 to 
2009.  The minimum reduction in crime reported by the Dallas Disruption Unit during 
this time period was a drop of 4%.  Although most of the 26 targeted areas had 
substantial reductions in offenses, six had increases, and one had no change at all. 
 The success of the Dallas Disruption Unit may not necessarily be translated into 
just the targeted areas.  Some of the highlights of the overall crime statistics of the City 
of Dallas since the implementation of the unit in 2005 through 2008 include a 45% 
reduction in aggravated assaults, a 15.8% reduction in homicides, and smaller 
reductions in incidents of burglary and robbery. (Appendix B). 
 The success of the Dallas Disruption Unit is not an isolated success story.  Many 
law enforcement departments around the United States have either implemented similar 
SOU initiatives or created special operations units that have several divisions or special 
training and operational initiatives.  Some of the best examples of these jurisdictions are 






Table A.  Departments Utilizing Special Operations Units 
 
Police Agency     State 
 
Chicago Police Department Illinois 
Kansas City Police Department Kansas 
King County Sheriff’s Department Washington 
Los Angeles Police Department California 
New Bern Police Department North Carolina 
Rochester Police Department New York 
San Jose Police Department California 
Scranton Police Department Pennsylvania 
 
Firearms and drugs are major contributing factors in many violent crimes.  It is 
common knowledge that illicit drug manufacturing, sales, and distribution have become 
big money makers for criminals in the United States.  Drug dealers, almost always 
associated with gang activity, tend to be the major perpetrators of violent crimes.  When 
directed police patrols, sometimes referred to as saturated patrols, are implemented in 
high crime areas, the opportunities for police officers to apprehend violators before they 
commit violent crimes is substantially increased.  With a zero-tolerance policy, illegally 
possessed firearms and other contraband can be confiscated and removed from the 
streets, thus making neighborhoods potentially safer from violent crime. 
 The primary focus of the 1992-93 Kansas City Police Department quasi-
experiment previously mentioned was to “identify and seize illegally possessed firearms 
pursuant to arrests, traffic stops, and investigations of suspicious persons” (McGarrell et 
al., 2001, p. 127). The analysis of this experiment was compared with a similar initiative 
implemented in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1997.  The most striking result of the directed 
patrols was the drop in the number of homicides committed in Indianapolis.  In the 
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targeted areas, 1996 statistics reflected 11 homicides.  The homicides recorded for 
1997 in the targeted areas were reduced to one (McGarrell et al., 2001). 
 Initiatives that begin with SOU implementation can have long-term results for the 
community, but after the units have moved on to other targeted areas, the neighborhood 
watch group helps to determine the continued success of the crime prevention program.  
Citizens assisting with patrols, communications with the police department regarding 
criminal activities, and suspicious behaviors increase the likelihood that the SOU will not 
have to target the same area on a continued basis (City of Rowlett, 2005).  This applies 
to smaller communities rather than larger metropolis settings.  Generally, larger cities 
will require continued enforcement and high visibility to be successful.  But this can be 
achieved on a rotating basis, which, in turn, lowers the cost of the initiative.    
COUNTER POSITION 
 
 Studies reflect that police saturation in targeted areas do not always translate 
into a drop in crime (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974; Reed, 1995).  The largest 
measure of the success of a SOU is the statistical drop in crime in the targeted area.  
Another measure of success is citizen fear of crime.  If the fear of crime by citizens in a 
targeted area can be reduced, the resulting qualitative results can be validated with 
quantitative measures. 
 In a 1974 study in Kansas City, Missouri, the Kansas City Police department 
conducted an experiment on “Preventive Patrols.”  This study evaluated the potential 
reduction of crime by raising police patrols in various patrol beats.  This evaluation was 
the first systematic attempt to ascertain the effectiveness of routine preventive patrol 
(Reed, 1995).  Police patrols were increased in some areas, maintained at the pre-
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experiment levels in others and some areas had police presence withdrawn and only 
available for calls.  The study was conducted during the 12 month period between 
October 1, 1972 and September 30, 1973 and reflected statistical evidence that 
saturated police presence does not necessarily translate into a reduction in crime.  The 
study further asserted the claim that “routine preventive patrol in marked police cars has 
little value in preventing crime or making citizens feel safe” (Kelling et al., 1974; Pate, 
Dieckman, & Brown, 1974, p. vii).  The end result of the Kansas City preventive patrol 
research, according to David H. Bayley, was that the findings were generally accepted 
as being true, but the experiment’s research strategy is considered seriously flawed, 
and most police departments have ignored the results in favor of random patrols 
(Bayley, 1998).  
 Another argument against SOU creation is that the shift in police presence sends 
criminal elements into other jurisdictions to commit crime, therefore not eliminating 
crime or criminal elements but forcing potential crime onto other areas within the same 
city, outside the targeted areas, or to other cities and jurisdictions.  The spillover effect, 
as the theory is known by, is somewhat supported by the data in the Kansas City 
Preventative Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974). This theory corresponds to the 
potential that where there is desire to commit crime, opportunities will be sought 
elsewhere.  Based on the overwhelming number of findings that support targeted 
deterrence, the spillover effect theory has minimal support.  In some cases, police 
patrols do not stop a crime in itself but change the location of the offense (Reed, 1995).  
A quasi-experiment conducted in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1997 provided some support 
for this position.  Although homicide rates dropped in targeted areas for directed police 
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patrols, homicides increased for the remainder of the city by 53% from 1996 to 1997 
(McGarrell et al., 2001, p. 137). 
 August Vollmer wrote on police services and police patrols in his 1936 book, The 
Police and Modern Society.  In his book, Vollmer wrote “it [police patrols] is society’s 
best defense against the criminal.  The mere sight of uniformed officials diligently 
patrolling beats is often sufficient to deter the community’s weaker members from 
committing legal infractions” (Reed, 1995, p. 7).  Superintendent of the Chicago Police 
Department and influential leader in the field of policing, O.W. Wilson stated: 
 The apparent likelihood of arrest influences the degree to which the potential 
 offender is convinced that the opportunity for successful misconduct is absent.  
 Patrol provides this favorable influence more completely than any other branch of 
 police service.  An impression of omnipresence is created by frequent and 
 conspicuous patrol at every hour and in all sections of immediate apprehensions 
 is spread by press, radio, and word of mouth.  The potential offender is thus 
 persuaded without the necessity of personal experience that the patrol is 
 invulnerable. (Reed, 1995, p. 8) 
Directed police patrols have proven time and again that they can be a deterrent to 
crime.  Reductions in violent crimes are generally the result of many studies completed 
on the establishment of a crime prevention initiative such as a special operations unit. 
 Retired Judge, Lois G. Forer, who spent 32 years practicing law, served as 
Deputy Attorney General in Pennsylvania, and served 16 years as criminal law judge, 
made several observations and conclusions about curbing criminal behavior.  She 
illustrated a seven-point plan for combating crime and crime prevention.  Her plan 
included gun control, education, restitution, and heavy fines.  Also included were jobs 
for criminals, consistency in sentencing, and redress for victims.  Her comments about 
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crime prevention and plans to address criminal behavior did not include increasing 
police forces, additional arrests, larger jails, or tougher judges (Bouza, 1993).  Although 
she must have concluded that crime prevention should start with making an impact on 
family and social issues, her answers did not address the impact of additional police 
deterrence as a possible crime prevention method for potential criminal activity that 
does not respond to education, heavy fines, and the rest of her seven-point plan. 
CONCLUSION 
 The patrol function has historically been viewed as what could be referred to as 
the backbone of policing, and “has been considered the most important and visible part 
of police work” (Peak, 2003, p. 117).  Due to the proven success of numerous special 
operation units within the United States, police departments should create a special 
operations unit in order to lower the crime rate within their city.  Prevention is the 
primary function of law enforcement, and it is integral in dealing with the rising crime 
related to violence, illegal drugs, and gang activity.  Not only does increased police 
presence in a targeted area provide deterrence for crime, but this increase of presence 
provides more opportunities for officers to detect and apprehend offenders of other 
crimes. 
 The evidence for crime prevention through the creation of special operations 
units is supported by the numerous theories and sources that have experimented with 
deterrence and high visibility and succeeded in their efforts.  The evidence suggested 
that simply adding more police officers and not providing direction for the use of those 
officers will have little, if any, effect on reducing crime (Fritsch et al., 2003).  The 
involvement of the community is required, including communicating with police, 
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assisting in the efforts to deter and apprehend criminals, and making citizens more 
cognizant of potential criminal acts. 
 The statistical data against special operations units as an effective tool in crime 
prevention is minute in relation to the evidence that supports the success of increased 
police presence and enforcement initiatives.  The statistics supporting the role of 
directed police patrols provides evidence that, almost anywhere in the United States, 
such programs can be successful in deterrence and providing safer communities.  The 
conclusions of a 1974 mathematical study of direct deterrence revealed that police can 
provide saturation coverage, which heightens prevention for specific areas of the city, 
and patrol can “‘create the appearance of being everywhere at once’ by implementing a 
shifting-saturation strategy” (Riccio 1974, p. 215).  A lasting benefit of special operations 
units is their ability to help revitalize neighborhoods by reducing crime and preventing 
criminals with opportunities to commit offenses.  For those criminals that have the 
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APPENDIX A 
Eyes of Rowlett 
“An innovative community policing program, designed to provide emergency 
assistance, utilizing cell phones and existing two-way radio communications.  The 
participants provide alert eyes and ears to law enforcement to significantly and cost-
effectively enhance crime prevention and aid persons in need.” (Miller 2005, 1) 
 
How to report a crime or suspicious activity: 
 Use 9-1-1 to report an emergency or crime in progress. 
 Be Calm. Identify yourself and your location. 
 Give a complete description of suspect(s):  Should include gender, race, 
age hair/eye color, weight/height, build, weapon, unusual characteristics. 
 Give address or location of crime or suspicious activity. (Use landmarks) 
 Give description of the crime or suspicious activity. 
 Give description of the vehicle. 
 Let the dispatcher know if there are any injuries. 
 Let the dispatcher know if any weapons are involved. 
  Limit access to a crime site until it can be secured by police and crime 









City of Dallas, Texas Crime Statistics 2005-2008 
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 
YEAR 2005 
Population 
1,230,303       Aggravated     Auto    
  Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft Total 
                  
Number of offenses 202 562 6,882 7,783 22,363 52,315 14,277 104,202 
         - 
Rate per 100,000 16.4 45.7 559.4 632.6 1,817.7 4,252.2 1,160 8,484.4 
         - 
Offenses Cleared 150 293 1,302 3,158 1,818 9,613 1,209 17,543 
         - 
Percent Cleared 74 52 19 41 8 18 8 17 
         - 
Index Crime Arrests 44 118 616 1,266 860 4,307 1,492 8,703 
 
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 
YEAR 2006 
Population 
1,248,223       Aggravated     Auto    
  Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft Total 
                  
Number of offenses 187 665 6,914 7,292 21,653 50,009 13,930 100,650 
         - 
Rate per 100,000 15 53.3 553.9 584.2 1,734.7 4,006.4 1,116 8,063.5 
         - 
Offenses Cleared 151 324 1,312 2,976 1,674 8,257 1,018 15,712 
         - 
Percent Cleared 81 49 19 41 8 17 7 16 
         - 






DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 
YEAR 2007 
Population 
1,239,104       Aggravated     Auto    
  Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft Total 
                  
Number of offenses 200 511 7,222 5,315 22,472 47,699 13,791 97,210 
         - 
Rate per 100,000 16.1 41.2 582.8 428.9 1,813.6 3,849.5 1,113 7,845.1 
         - 
Offenses Cleared 116 299 1,252 2,241 1,433 8,520 1,302 15,163 
         - 
Percent Cleared 58 59 18 42 7 18 10 16 
         - 
Index Crime Arrests 22 104 786 1,012 933 4,465 951 8,273 
 
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 
YEAR 2008 
Population 
1,276,214       Aggravated     Auto    
  Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft Total 
                  
Number of offenses 174 499 6,466 4,285 21,149 42,402 12,208 87,179 
         - 
Rate per 100,000 13.3 39.1 506.7 335.8 1,657.2 3322.5 956.6 6,831.2 
         - 
Offenses Cleared 111 305 1,153 1,942 1,626 7,800 1,296 13,933 
         - 
Percent Cleared 65 61 18 45 6 18 11 16 
         - 
Index Crime Arrests 11 100 705 1,156 1,026 4,410 716 8,124 
 
(Texas Department of Public Safety, 2005-2008)  
 
